for authorizing the operation of its information systems. This authorization process, known as accreditation within the DoD, has always been based on certification testing of those systems and an assessment of the risks associated with operating those systems on the DoD's Global Information Grid (GIG). Despite using these various costly and process-intensive methods for certification and accreditation (C&A), it is questionable whether or not these processes have actually improved the security of DoD systems and networks commensurate with the cost and effort involved. Further, given current advances in systems security technologies, recent changes in DoD's strategy for operating in cyberspace, and even the very structure of the DoD's enterprise networks in the near future, should (or even can) the DoD continue to test and authorize information systems using these same methodologies? This paper addresses this question and proposes other ways the DoD can more effectively assess its systems and networks to better ensure their security over time.
Effectiveness of the Department of Defense Information Assurance Accreditation Process
For many years, the Department of Defense (DoD) has used very formalized processes for authorizing the operation of its information systems. This authorization process, known as accreditation within the DoD, has always been based on certification testing of those systems and an assessment of the risks associated with operating those systems on the DoD's Global Information Grid (GIG). Despite using these various costly and process-intensive methods for certification and accreditation (C&A), it is questionable whether or not these processes have actually improved the security of DoD systems and networks commensurate with the cost and effort involved. Further, given current advances in systems security technologies, recent changes in DoD's strategy for operating in cyberspace, and even the very structure of the DoD's enterprise networks in the near future, should (or even can) the DoD continue to test and authorize information systems using these same methodologies. This paper addresses this question and proposes other ways the DoD can more effectively assess its systems and networks to better ensure their security over time.
Evolution of DoD's Accreditation Process
In 1972, the DoD published DoD Directive 5200.28, Security Requirements for Automated Information Systems, which it later updated in 1988. Along with DoD Directive 5200.28-STD, also known as the "Orange Book," which was released in 1983, these directives formed the basis for the testing and accreditation of systems within DoD. These directives left room for interpretation with regard to process, which resulted in each of the military services specifying in its own regulations similar, but separate, 2 accreditation processes to be used within that service. From the beginning, the accreditation processes used within the DoD focused on discrete, individual systems as the target of testing and accreditation.
In 1997, the DoD published DoD Instruction 5200.40, DoD Information
Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process (DITSCAP). The objective of this new regulation was "to establish a DoD standard infrastructure-centric approach that protects and secures the entities comprising the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII). The set of activities presented in the DITSCAP standardized the C&A process for single information technology (IT) entities that leads to more secure system operations and a more secure DII. The process considers the system mission, environment, and architecture while assessing the impact of operation of that system on the DII." 1 This effort to synchronize the certification and accreditation process across the entire DoD, and to begin assessing risks in terms of the enterprise was a step in the right direction, but even the DITSCAP still focused on discrete, individual systems as the target of testing and accreditation.
In 2006, the DoD replaced the DITSCAP with the DoD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP), as published interim guidance, and later (2007) finalized in DoD Instruction 8510.01. Ostensibly, this change was made to "address the paradigm shift in IA security from an individual information system-level approach to a DoD-wide enterprise approach of securing information systems in a netcentric environment and for supporting the implementation of IA security during a system's life cycle" 2 This sounds a lot like what the DITSCAP was intended to do, but 3 the DIACAP still tested and accredited individual systems and discrete enclaves (e.g., local area networks) that could be tested and accredited as one "system."
Currently, the DoD is transitioning, along with the rest of the federal government, to the use of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk
Management Framework (RMF) as specified in NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-37, and the NIST-developed set of controls published in NIST SP 800-53. In fact, the current DIACAP aligns closely with the intent of and process called out in the NIST RMF. The most significant changes the DoD will have to adjust to will be the new RMFrelated language (e.g., "Authorizing Official" under the RMF versus "Designated Approving Authority" under the DIACAP) and, more significantly, the new set of controls in NIST SP 800-53.
Despite what would seem a limited change to how the DoD historically conducted C&A, there are significant benefits offered by the RMF. One of these is to enable reciprocity between Federal agencies, including the DoD. It forces all Federal agencies to one common authorization process, common security controls, common testing activities and outcome assessment, as well as a common lexicon. Using one standardized process will also reduce costs related to the activities associated with system authorization. "A great example would be a medical system that has been purchased by the DoD for their Military Treatment Facilities (MTF), as well as by the Veterans Administration (VA) for use in their hospitals. Under the current situation, this new system would be required to undergo two separate processes: a C&A utilizing DIACAP for the DoD and a system authorization based on NIST guidelines for the VA 4 hospitals. The cost for purchasing and deploying that system has now significantly increased as a consequence of the requirement for distinctly separate processes." 3 Clearly, the DoD has placed significant emphasis on C&A processes over the last three decades, but what does C&A really get you? Many outside the information systems security field do not realize that C&A is just an assurance process that does not in and of itself provide any security. It provides only a level of confidence (i.e., assurance) that the system/network in question is compliant with the security requirements levied against it, and attempts to quantify the risks associated with any security weaknesses identified by the testing. Ultimately, an approving authority uses this risk information to decide whether or not the system/network in question will be allowed to operate for the next three years. There are inherent problems with C&A as the DoD has been performing it for decades; problems that will persist even using the NIST RMF.
C&A presents only a "snapshot" of the system's compliance when the system was tested. System and network administrators generally have too much to do and have to deal with many competing priorities. If keeping the system/network secure is not at the top of their list of priorities, administrators may put off their security related duties (e.g., patching and proper configuration management) until a certification test is imminent. Then they will "surge" to clean up the security posture of their system/network just for the test. This has been a common scenario identified by US Army Information Systems Engineering Command (USAISEC) certification testers. The result of this type of paradigm is systems and networks that remain in a poor state of security until just before a certification test takes place. After testing is completed the 5 system/network may once again fall out of compliance and its security posture will be significantly reduced. Of course, the authorizing official has no way of knowing this when he/she is making the authorization decision, or afterwards as the system is being operated over time. The poor state of a system's security might never be known to those responsible for its approval until (at best) it is up for retesting and reaccreditation some time later, or (at worst) it is compromised in some way as a result of the vulnerabilities its administrators allowed to creep into the system over time.
C&A within the DoD has been an expensive endeavor. people. When we focus on testing and accrediting only the system or network, that is akin to issuing a driver's license to an automobile instead of the driver responsible for operating that automobile. While completing over 700 certification tests on information systems and networks of all types and sizes, time and time again USAISEC certification testers observed that organizations that had mature security processes, and made them a part of their day-to-day operations (i.e., operationalized them), maintained secure systems and did well during certification testing. Conversely, organizations that did not operationalize their security processes invariably had poorly secured systems and did poorly during certification testing. The lesson is, test the people and the security processes they have in place, not just the systems and devices, for a more accurate picture of the long term security posture of that organization.
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The C&A process as currently required by DoD takes too long to be effective. In The strategy calls for the rapid movement of concepts from an innovative idea, to pilot program, to scaled adoption across the DoD enterprise. In short, "DoD's cyberspace acquisition programs will reflect the adaptive nature of cyberspace; it will emphasize agility, embrace new operating concepts, and foster collaboration across the scientific community and the U.S. government as a whole." 7 The current highly structured, process-intensive, and time-consuming C&A process the DoD relies upon is not a good fit for the fast moving and rapidly changing environment described in the strategy document. 10 The inclusion of the qualifier "when possible" could be problematic later but this is a step in the right direction; assuming this concept is eventually signed into law. Unfortunately, this update still misses the mark in its reporting requirement, which is that federal agencies must submit "an annual report on the adequacy and effectiveness of information security policies, procedures and practices, and compliance with the requirement of this subchapter." 11 It seems, despite changes in the way the Federal Information Security Management Act is being implemented, the emphasis is still on reporting rather than on actual security posture. As a result, "the new FISMA looks a lot like the old FISMA." 12 Still, FISMA did heighten awareness of systems security across the federal government and at least began to hold agencies accountable for the security of their information systems and networks.
How Does the Commercial/Private Sector Handle C&A?
In general, there are no mandated information systems security requirements or C&A process in the commercial/private sector that are comparable to the DoD's security controls and C&A process. One exception is the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), which protects the privacy of individuals' personal health information, establishes certain patient rights, and specifies a series of administrative, physical, and technical safeguards that "covered entities" (such as insurance companies and health care providers) must use to assure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic protected health information. 13 However, while HIPAA levies privacy and security requirements, it does not mandate any certification & accreditation mechanism. It only specifies implementation of the safeguards and requires covered entities to make proof of implementation available to the Federal Government upon request.
For the most part, commercial/private entities make their own internal assessments as to how much security their systems and networks require, and implement security safeguards accordingly. In these cases, security requirements are generally not well documented nor is there any formal process in place for testing safeguards or authorizing the operation of systems. In certain cases commercial entities do recognize the importance of the confidentiality, integrity and availability of their corporate information and take concrete steps to protect their systems and networks. Typically, this type of scenario would involve the development of internal company policies, procedures and standards for systems and information security based on recognized best practices; pre-deployment configuration and testing of information systems/devices on the corporate network; independent auditing of business critical systems; and establishment of an internal security review process to ensure ongoing compliance. These duties and responsibilities are typically split between the information technology (IT) department and the security department. What lesson might the DoD draw from this corporate example? That it may be more useful and efficient to focus on an organization's process maturity than it is to focus just on testing and approving its systems. Technology is temporary, while organizational maturity endures.
NIST Risk Management Framework
In 2007, the NIST, the Intelligence Community (IC), the DoD, academia, and commercial industry collaborated to develop and implement a more standardized, streamlined and effective certification and accreditation process. The result is the NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF) as specified in NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-37. The RMF has already been adopted by all other Federal agencies, and the DOD has begun its initial steps in its transition from the DIACAP. 16 As mentioned earlier in this paper, the current DIACAP already aligns closely with the RMF in both process and intent. Noteworthy differences include a new lexicon and changes in some of the roles associated with the new "assessment and authorization" process (formerly known as certification and accreditation under the DIACAP).
Additionally, the RMF puts significantly more emphasis on "Continuous
Monitoring" activities that take place after a system is granted its authorization to operate. Continuous Monitoring is addressed in more detail below. NIST itself relates in its main ISCM guidance document that "ISCM is most effective when automated mechanisms are employed where possible for data collection and reporting. While this document encourages the use of automation, it is recognized that many aspects of ISCM programs are not easily automated." 22 Organizations face significant challenges with the technologies that enable automated monitoring.
"Organizations typically use a diverse set of security products from multiple vendors.
Thus it is necessary to extract security-related information (ideally in the form of raw system state data) from these tools and to normalize that data so that it is comparable." 23 This type of work can be labor intensive, time consuming, and requires skilled analysts even when they are leveraging automated analysis tools.
Also, not all of the security controls that the DoD requires can be monitored in an CSPs have applied for FedRAMP authorization, and more than 50 companies have applied to third-party assessment organizations for review, with 16 being successfully tested to date. 26 The DoD Joint Information Environment
Recognizing the benefits of cloud based computing, the DoD has made the shift to cloud based services an important part of its Joint Information Environment (JIE)
concept. Along with providing common services at the enterprise (i.e., DoD) level, architectures shared across the services, and consolidation of servers into large scale data centers, the department will move toward cloud computing, which offers great efficiencies not only in hardware and software, but also in data sharing. 27 The move to a Joint Information Environment is intended to have positive security impacts as well.
According to GEN Keith Alexander, U.S. Army, current Commander of the DoD's Cyber
Command and Director of the National Security Agency:
Our current information systems architecture in the Department of Defense was not built with security uppermost in mind, let alone with the idea of operationalizing it to enable military missions. Instead, we have seven million networked devices in 15,000 DoD network enclaves. Our vision is to fashion that architecture into an operational platform, not just a channel for communications and a place for data storage. To do so, our DoD cyber enterprise, with the Department's Chief Information Officers, DISA, and Cyber Command helping to lead the way, will build a common cloud infrastructure across the Department and the Services that will not only be more secure but more efficient--and ultimately less costly in this time of diminishing resources--than what we have today. Our operational objectives are to reduce the number of network enclaves to the minimum possible; to implement a common cloud-based infrastructure to improve security across all of DoD. 28 Given the fast moving nature of the technology and the DoD's timeline, the move to a Joint Information Environment will require timely, adaptive and effective security processes to ensure the transition does not introduce unacceptable levels of risk. The DoD's current C&A process is not timely or adaptive enough to support this transition and provide the level of assurance that the DoD needs.
Conclusions
Have the approaches used by the DoD to test and approve its systems and networks over the years improved the DoD's security posture and lessened the DoD's risks? After over three decades of testing and accrediting our systems, you might assume our systems would be highly secure and successful intrusions would be rare. All these organizations could be assessed in terms of the adequacy and maturity of their organizational security processes and be accredited on that basis.
This organizational accreditation approach resolves many of the issues associated with the current DoD C&A process previously identified in this paper. It resolves the issue of C&A being a "snapshot in time" approach because it is not focusing on the security posture of a system, network or device today, but on the ability of the organization to develop, manage and operate its systems in a secure manner over a period of time. It resolves the issue of current C&A not being agile and adaptive enough to accommodate the rapid pace of advancements in the information technology field. Since accreditation is not tied to the technology (i.e., the systems and devices), but to the organization itself, the organization is trusted to update its technology in a controlled and secure manner -no constant system re-certifications and reaccreditations required. The development and fielding of new systems can be accomplished much more rapidly because C&A, often the "long pole in the tent," is no longer tied to the system itself. The Program Manager's organization has already proven that it can develop and field a secure system, so system deployment can be 21 accomplished without delay and the system carries with it the accreditation of the organization. Last but not least, an organizational accreditation approach will result in significant cost savings for the DoD. The number of organizations that would undergo the accreditation process is much smaller than the number of systems and networks that currently require accreditation thereby greatly reducing the expense of accomplishing and tracking accreditations across the enterprise. Lastly, the time period an organizational accreditation is good for could be increased from the current three year period, thereby introducing additional cost savings.
This shift in approach will not require a wholesale scrapping of previous work that has already been done to improve system/network security. Many, if not most, of the requirements embodied in the NIST SP 800-53 controls actually apply to organizational processes and are adaptable to organizational accreditations with little or no modification. Likewise, the NIST Risk Management Framework (NIST SP 800-37) can be adapted by the DoD if it chooses to accredit organizations rather than discrete systems.
Continuous monitoring as described earlier in this paper also holds great promise in lowering the level of risk to DoD systems. Continuous monitoring should not replace C&A but should augment it. It should not replace C&A because, as related above, there are controls that cannot be monitored in an automated fashion. Those controls can be assessed as part of a periodic C&A process, and even periodically reassessed thereafter, but to say they can be "continuously" monitored is not realistic. Whether Guidelines would represent a significant augmentation to any C&A approach the DoD uses. As mentioned previously, organizations rarely have all the resources they need to dedicate to system/network security. During the next several years, looming budget cuts will only make this problem more acute. As such, the ability to prioritize security efforts so an organization is getting maximum "bang for the buck" will be critical. 
